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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
It is the purpose of this paper to survey the change 
that the French military security policy underwent during 
the years of Charles de Gaulle's presidency. In the years 
between 1958 and 1969 Charles de Gaulle transformed the 
French military system. With the evolution of the Force 
Nucléaire Stratégique the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­
tion ceased to be the bulwark of France's security. It 
is this transformation, its reasons and the phenomena 
affecting it that this paper undertakes to examine.
PATTERNS OF GOVERNMENT
Political science offers a number of approaches through 
which information can be processed such that those elements 
perceived as important can be focused upon. It is through 
the decision-making process, more specifically the "patterns 
of government" framework posited by Samuel Beer and Adam 
Ulam,^ that this paper analyzes the transformation of France's 
military security policy. Beer and Ulam view government from
^Samuel Beer and Adam Ulam, Patterns of Government 
(New York: Random House, 1958), pp. 12-51.
the perspective of four patterns: political culture, power, 
interests, and policy. Although these patterns each focuses 
upon a different aspect of decision-making, they are not 
mutually exclusive or independent. Each relies upon the 
other patterns in a relationship analogous to that between 
the various organs within a living body; all are necessary 
in order to sustain the whole.
Although the pattern of policy is most appropriate 
for examining France's military security policy, without 
the inclusion of the other three patterns an understanding 
of its policy decisions could not be obtained. Policy is 
the end-product of the "patterns of government" process.
The machinery which produces this product is found in a 
nation's political culture, pattern of power, and pattern 
of interests. The following paragraphs are briefly de­
voted to describing each of these patterns of government; 
their more specific application with regard to the sub­
stantive topic of this paper is dealt with in later chap­
ters .
Political culture is the most "unique" of the patterns 
of government. It alone of the four patterns is not 
identified by Beer and Ulam as a "pattern of"; this lack 
of designation is symbolic of its broader scope. If the 
pattern of policy is the end-product of this process po­
litical culture represents the "industrial plant" in which
the process takes place. Political culture is the environ­
ment of government, the fundamental limits and capabilities 
of a society. It is a composition of the shared beliefs, 
attitudes and values of the individuals within a society 
as they apply towards its political life. The aggregation 
of these individual beliefs, values, and attitudes can be 
either direct as in the case of the small, classical de­
mocracies or indirect through the use of groups or a demo­
cratic centralist concept. The consensus that results 
from this process provides a society with the purposes 
which set the scope within which governmental actions 
take place.
Whereas political culture represents the foundation 
and framework of the patterns of government, the patterns 
of power and interests are the internal structure. It is 
through these two patterns that policy is "worked out."
The patterns of power and interests are associated with 
each other in a "means-ends" relationship. Their applica­
tion is somewhat based upon the basis of group aggregation; 
i.e., individuals affect policy through groups. The pat­
tern of power designates the resources or capabilities 
which groups possess. Power is distributed unequally 
throughout society; groups vary, as do nations, in what 
they are capable of doing. Capability studies abound in 
international relations and serve as an example of what
the pattern of power means within an individual society.
The pattern of interests acts with the pattern of power; 
it represents the intensity of desire for a given course 
of action. Not all groups are concerned with or desire 
the same things. Hence, intensity of interest modifies 
the power relationships. Groups without an interest in 
a subject do not enter into the process of decision­
making regardless of how powerful they may be; in the same 
vein groups without relative power can exert little affect 
upon policy formation regardless of their interests. Power 
and interests are relative to other groups that are involved 
in the specific decision-making case.
The interaction of the patterns of power and interests 
result in the pattern of policy, the end-product of the 
patterns of government. The pattern of policy involves 
not only what decisions have been made but what the conse­
quences of those decisions are. This is a dialectic pro­
cess whereby a new policy does not remain isolated but 
introduces new demands or inputs upon the political struc­
ture. A change in policy is a change in a society's en­
vironment and leads to further changes. The pattern of 
policy is the culmination of a specific series of inter­
actions within the polity that is grouped under the label 
"patterns of government."
WORLD VIEW
Events of interest to political scientists do not take 
place in vacuums; they occur within a world in which many, 
many other events are transpiring. The patterns of govern­
ment approach (and the decision-making process itself) 
focuses upon one event within this whole multi-event occur­
rence. It is therefore necessary to relate the specific 
event being examined within a "world view" perspective.
This is essentially a justification for the importance of 
the matter under study. While dealing only with the mili­
tary security policy of France, it can be related to the 
"whole" in general terms of national security. The follow­
ing paragraphs are devoted to providing perspective for 
military security policy and are derived from a presenta­
tion (there are methods of relating these relationships
other than the one presented here) originated by Kenneth
2Thompson and Roy Macridis.
Society exists in order for its members to enjoy the 
economic benefits or material security that the world 
affords them*, the state, as an instrument of society, exists 
primarily to protect that material security. The modern 
state recognizes this function as a major factor in its 
raison d 'être. The protection and enhancement of material
2Roy Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics 
(4th ed.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
1972), pp. 4-21.
security by government has grown with the expansion of 
government in what is perhaps a causual relation.
The real world is composed neither of independent 
individuals nor of a world state. The nation-state 
system represents the instrument by which material se­
curity is dealt with. It also introduces a number of sui 
generis parameters that have to be dealt with, too. While 
Other governmental instruments could perhaps avoid these 
"problems," they would each give rise to others particular 
to each. These debates over governmental systems are the 
subject of political theory and lie outside the scope of 
this paper. Today, the nation-state system dominates 
the real world and is what is "pertinent." Military se­
curity is a parameter of the nation-state system. As 
groups within a society are unequal in power, so are 
nations in the world. Decision-making processes recog­
nize that the clash of groups (patterns of power and 
interests) is a permanent condition. Since the nation­
state system is another group system, conflict can be 
viewed as permanent. Of course, conflict need not be 
violent. Military security represents both a concept 
for violence and the prevention of violence (deterrence 
strategy).
States that are "better off" may fear other states 
or desire more; i.e., further better themselves and
perceive an advantage in resorting to violence. Pre­
emptive wars and imperialism have roots that lie in a 
nation’s material security. Economic determinism may not 
be the only motivation for a state’s actions; but as long 
as material security is a primary function of a govern­
ment, it must be of major significance. However, the 
violent uses of military security are seen as becoming 
less and less desirable. As states become industrialized 
or modernized, the costs of war rise prohibitively. 
Deterrence strategy which can be seen within the origins 
of the balance of power concept aims at preventing war.
It is interesting that this concept has been most preva­
lent among the most advanced nations (it has not always 
worked for them and the consequences have been drastic); 
i.e., those states that are the best off and have the most 
to lose.
While material security is perceived as a domestic 
concern (a perception that with growing economic interde­
pendence is fading), military security is the major ele­
ment of foreign policy. Military security ("national 
security" is the term used by the United States govern­
ment in grouping its various military security agencies 
together) is composed of what are termed as "defense 
(military)" and "foreign affairs" elements. Although 
defense ministries (formerly war ministries) represent
the capability to use force more than foreign ministries, 
both place great emphasis upon their "protective mission."
A final parameter affecting the relationship between 
material security and military security is the reappearance 
of the former as social welfare demands. Since the society 
(and its instrument, the state) exist in order to protect 
and enhance the material security of its members, these 
members have a right to expect to enjoy these material bene­
fits (relabeled as "social welfare" demands). The modern 
state has been increasingly met with social welfare demands 
on the part of its citizens. Since the state has tradi­
tionally handled a society’s military security requirements, 
this results in the same institution openly having to fund 
or foster both. Military security and social welfare pro­
grams both place demands upon the economic resources of a 
state and its society. Very few people, if any, possess 
"enough" material security. The limited resources of a 
society (and the much more limited resources of the state) 
are subject to demands to fulfill both functions. Each 
state must allocate its resources between these two areas. 
The failure to fund adequately either (in the case of 
military security this is determined when another state 
"tests" its security) can be disastrous.
The balance between military security and social wel­
fare is one of the dynamic questions of modern society and
government. This balance determines capabilities: both those 
of today and those of tomorrow ("capital investment" in social 
welfare). Hence, the consequences of policies (and the 
demands for new policies or changes in old policies) arise 
within the field of this military security-social welfare 
balance, and like in agriculture this year's crop provides 
the seed for next year's crop.
METHODOLOGY
Military security policy which falls within the scope 
of foreign policy studies lends itself readily to the util­
ization of "descriptive analysis"^ or "problem analysis."^ 
These two methods are essentially the same, although problem 
analysis is more specifically designed for foreign policy 
analysis; they will be used as synonyms in this paper. This 
technique is applicable both to the categorization of inter­
actions and to the delineation of important events. It is, 
of course, open to subjective conclusions, but this argument 
is equally applicable to any method. Objectivity is the 
result of researchers and not of methods per se.
Descriptive analysis is most often questioned because 
it is essentially non-empirical. While empirical research
3Oran Young, Systems of Political Science (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 5-6.
^David 0. Wilkinson, Comparative Foreign Relations : 
Framework and Methods (Belmont, California: Dickenson Pub­
lishing Co., 1969), pp. 138-153.
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is a useful tool, it is not universally applicable. Foreign 
policy areas do not lend themselves to empirical studies; 
quantification is often impossible and when it is, often 
meaningless.^ It can be valuable when used in conjunction 
with other methods to enhance the "precision" of study. 
Foreign policy is often made in small groups amidst great 
secrecy. The mathematical models upon which empiricism 
rests require larger numbers and the greater availability 
of data (which is really a requirement for any scholarly 
research). Statistical methods are designed to be employed 
with groups and not with individual cases.
A second criticism of descriptive analysis is its 
normative or subjective character. The material chosen 
for presentation and the weight given to it are determined 
by the author. However, this is really no different from 
what is done in empirical papers. Subjective choices and 
the introduction of value judgments are inherent in any 
study dependent upon human beings.
The source material utilized in this paper has been 
"processed" in conformity with the methods proposed in 
the previously cited "problem analysis" of David Wilkinson.
Burton M. Sapin, éd.. Contemporary American Foreign 
and Military Policy (Glenview^ Illinois : Scott, Foresman 
and Co., 1970), pp. 181-185.
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A combination of documents, memoirs, and scholarly (includ­
ing both academic and journalistic) articles are utilized. 
Because this paper focuses upon the pattern of policy, it 
draws heavily upon the available French governmental 
sources. The French government, perhaps because it was 
undertaking a major change in its military security policy, 
has published (both in French and English) all of the major 
(by their perception) speeches, press conferences and state­
ments that were issued by Charles de Gaulle and the other 
important figures of the Fifth Republic. Various journals 
interested in these specific areas have also provided cover­
age of the events discussed in this paper. Since Charles de 
Gaulle played a paramount role in this entire process, the 
availability of his memoirs is a significant source. How­
ever, it should be noted that at the time of his death he 
had not completed those portions dealing with the latter 
years of his presidency; those portions completed do, how­
ever, provide information on much of what he desired to do 
and put into motion.
The journal articles (including books) used have pri­
marily served the purpose of "internal criticism."^ Internal 
criticism is the checking of the validity of one source by
Louis Gottshalk, Clyde Kluckholm, and Robert Angell, 
The Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology and 
Sociology (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1945) , 
p . 38.
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comparing it with other ’’independent” sources. Since problem 
analysis relies so heavily upon the use of documents, internal 
criticism is an essential methodological undertaking. Only 
those sources that have met this check (a subjective judg­
ment) have been used and the citations are of what is per­
ceived to have been the prevailing attitudes within the 
French government. The journal articles serve the further 
related purpose of providing ’’background” information with 
regard to the events described in this paper.
SUBSTANTIVE TEXT
The following three chapters (Chapters II-IV) are de­
voted to the analysis of the French withdrawal from NATO 
and the concurrent establishment of the French nuclear 
deterrent within the patterns of government framework.
While the major concern of this paper is with the change 
in policy that occurred, it is necessary to understand the 
underlying cultural, power and interest relationships that 
enabled [or failed to prevent) Charles de Gaulle to carry 
this change out.
Chapter II is devoted to the limitations placed upon 
the policy-makers by France’s political culture. It focuses 
upon two areas: the search for security and its effect upon 
Charles de Gaulle. French life has been dominated by the 
search for security since its defeat in the Franco-Prussian
13
War and has been re-enforced by two world wars. This his­
torical background and its effects upon French society have 
resulted in a paramount concern for military security.
Charles de Gaulle was a product of this development (and, 
in fact, experienced most of it). Yet, individuals are 
different even though they have been subjected to the same 
socialization process. De Gaulle’s "personal" political 
culture, because of his position and strength, are of salient 
interest.
Chapter III is devoted to the patterns of power and 
interests. These two categories are "collapsed" together 
for the sake of convenience and better presentation. Three 
institutional "groups" are dealt with in this chapter: 
the "military," the "politicians," and the "administrators." 
Although most studies would not accord these groups such 
"low" status (they would be included within the decision­
making machinery itself) this presentation more accurately 
reflects the "true" relationships that existed. These groups 
were hardly "co-equals" with Charles de Gaulle; their in­
clusion within the decision-making machinery (which is 
reserved for de Gaulle in this paper) would falsely imply 
greater strength and influence than they actually possessed. 
Their support for announced policies could be valuable (as 
their opposition could be harmful or a hinderance), but that 
did not make them partners in the actual decision-making
14
process.
Chapter IV is devoted to the change in France's mili­
tary security policy. It is a rather "detailed" account of 
the reasoning and rationalization behind France's withdrawal 
from NATO and its decision to rely upon its own nuclear 
force (which it had to create) as the mainstay of its mili­
tary security policy. The decision-making apparatus and 
Charles de Gaulle are considered to be synonymous throughout 
this presentation. Also included in this chapter are the 
diplomatic events that transpired within the "Atlantic Com­
munity" between France and the United States. This "con­
frontation" is perhaps better described as being between 
the United States and Europe because many of the French 
arguments were shared (in modified form) by many of the 
other European allies.
The final chapter (Chapter V) examines the events 
that have transpired since Charles de Gaulle left office 
(until March, 1973) . It focuses upon the implementation 
(much of which was only in-process by 1969) of de Gaulle's 
policy and the consequences that have occurred because of 
the French nuclear force (with respect to NATO and France). 
It examines what changes have been forced upon de Gaulle's 
Successors because of the growing social welfare demands 
(evident since 1968). Because of the nature of problems- 
analysis consequences, much of this chapter will contain
15
opinions as to what the future holds for France’s military 
security policy.
CHAPTER II 
POLITICAL CULTURE
Political culture, like a play, sets the stage and 
scene upon which the roles of government and society are 
played out. A skilled and talented actor can bring much 
breadth and scope to his role; another actor may play the 
role so differently as to make it appear to be a quite dif­
ferent character. Both, however, are guided in their por­
trayals by the limits set forth in the script. This chapter 
attempts to outline the script that bounds French leaders 
and limits their behavior. For the most part these limits 
are derived from the socialization process. Since the 
French leaders are drawn from the population of France 
(admittedly in a very non-random fashion), they too share 
the basic beliefs, attitudes and values that compose 
France's political culture.
This chapter attempts to establish the broad outlines 
of political culture with respect to military security and 
to relate it to the development of individual leadership. 
Specifically, one cannot write of French policy, military 
or otherwise, during the 1960's without taking into account 
the character and personality of Charles de Gaulle; the
16
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imprint of Charles de Gaulle is evident everywhere.
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY
The French Revolution totally disrupted French society. 
For over 150 years France has struggled through a restruc­
turing process that is even today unfinished. The French 
people remain unintegrated politically and socially (it 
is their strong cultural heritage that serves as their 
bond). A number of fundamental social-political issues 
divide the French to such an extent that they cannot even 
achieve a consensus on what form of government they desire. 
More than once France has passed through the rotation of 
regimes: monarchy, republic, dictatorship, empire. In­
stability has ruled the political process because there is 
no consensus around which a stable system can be constructed.
The Revolutionary Republic was threatened by the entire 
might of Europe; it was against this background that Napoleon 
rose to power. The Napoleonic Era left France with a legend 
that not only inspired Frenchmen but other Europeans as well. 
The defeat of France by the Fourth Coalition ushered in a 
new era in European diplomacy, an era of threatened military 
security for France. Previous European wars had been fought 
within a classical balance of power system; realignment of 
allies continually took place. The French Revolution in 
introducing ideology (nationalism; liberalism) disrupted
18
this system. No longer did states "rationally" pursue 
their interests in shifting alliances.
The Fourth Coalition of victorious allies (Great 
Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria) were so shaken by 
the Napoleonic wars that they feared to restore the old 
balance of power with its "invisible hand." In the Treaty 
of Chaumont (March, 1814) the signatory powers (the members 
of the Fourth Coalition) agreed to unite in a Quadruple 
Alliance for twenty years and to hold periodic conferences 
to settle matters of mutual concern. This was a victor's 
coalition attempting to guarantee its victory (it perhaps 
served as a precedent for the world war settlements). The 
major purpose of the Quadruple Alliance was to prevent 
France from again threatening Europe, either militarily 
or covertly, through its revolutionary ideas. Although 
Franch had faced hostile alliances before, it was not 
accustomed to the total isolation and helplessness that 
it experienced following the fall of Napoleon.
The next fifty years were, for France, years of tor­
ment. The Napoleonic wars had drained it of strength, 
and the Industrial Revolution was weakening it relative to 
other powers such as Great Britain and the United States. 
However, it retained its reputation as an activist military 
state. French diplomacy strived, often successfully during 
the Bourbon and Orleanist monarchies, to overcome this
19
reputation and the military threat it engendered. With 
the institution of the Second Empire and another Napoleon 
the suspicion and distrust with which France had been viewed 
was revived.
The search for security that epitomizes modern France 
originated in the collapse of the Second Empire of Louis 
Napoleon as a result of his defeat in the Franco-Prussian 
War. All through the middle years of the nineteenth cen­
tury France's reputation exceeded its military capabilities. 
Whereas Napoleon I had been able to fight (and almost defeat) 
a coalition of Europe’s mightiest nations, Napoleon III was 
unable even to "make a decent showing" against what had been 
the weakest member of the Fourth Coalition. A preoccupation 
with military security emerged from France's defeat at the 
hands of Prussia in 1871.
The Third Republic came to life in a different world 
than the Second Empire had died in. France's borders were 
no longer "empty"; Germany and Italy had come into nation­
hood. The creation of two more strong states, states that 
were not necessarily friendly towards France, heightened 
the feelings of threatened security. The last decades of 
the nineteenth century were years of seeking. Driven by 
the desire for revanche and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, 
France actively sought out the allies for a future war 
against Germany. War scares appeared with unceasing regularity.
20
Otto von Bismarck was so successful in guiding German 
policy between 1870 and 1890 that he was able to keep France 
virtually isolated. This enabled Europe to remain in a 
state of relative peace during those years. France, al­
though it feared for its military security, was alone too 
weak to initiate a war that would have any chance of being 
won. With the "dropping of the pilot" by Wilhelm II in 
1890, the French were given the chance to break out of the 
isolation that Bismarck had imposed upon them. Bismarck 
had constructed a tremendous system in order to keep France 
isolated. He knew that it was from France alone that the 
German state had anything to fear. He was confident that 
Germany could defeat France, but if it was allied to any 
other state the outcome might differ. By minimizing German 
demands for an overseas colonial empire (he encouraged the 
French aspirations in this sphere as a means of creating 
conflicts between France and the other colonial powers) 
and the kindred demands for a large navy, Bismarck was 
able to carry on amiable relations with Great Britain.
The masterpiece of the Bismarckian system was his 
Austro-Russian diplomacy. By deftly playing the "honest 
broker" and fully utilizing Germany’s capabilities to act 
as a "balance," Bismarck was able to maintain alliances 
with both Austria and Russia (depriving France of a poten­
tial ally), whose competition for supremacy in the Balkans
21
was a constant threat to the peace.
With the removal of Bismarck, the French were able to 
exploit the Austro-Russian differences so successfully that 
within four years they were able to end their enforced 
isolation. The Franco-Russian Alliance in 1894 greatly 
enhanced France's military security. By deftly exploiting 
further German mistakes, France was able to create the 
Triple Entente. It was through the urging of France that 
Great Britain and Russia, who were competing for influence 
and empire in Asia, were brought together. The Triple 
Entente provided France with the security necessary in order 
to pursue its policy of revanche.
The balance of power concept is predicated upon the 
ability of the member states to unite together with such 
a preponderance of power that the perceived potential 
aggressor is deterred from his actions. Bismarck's Germany 
had performed this function with regard to Austria and 
Russia between 1870 and 1890 extremely well. The alliances 
that emerged in the early years of the nineteenth century 
failed in this task. The Triple Alliance of Germany,
Austria and Italy and the Triple Entente of France, Russia 
and Great Britain were too rigid and equal in strength to 
perform a deterrence role upon each other. In fact, de- 
terrance (and, hence, the balance of powers) was not the 
objective of France. Although France desired protection
22
from Germany, its goals of revanche and the recovery of 
Alsace-Lorraine were such that they could only be achieved 
through war.
The effects of World War I transformed France's mili­
tary security policy from revisionist to defensive. Its 
goals of revanche and the recovery of irredenta had been 
achieved, but the costs had also been tremendous. World 
War I was fought mainly upon French soil. Coupled with 
this devastation was the great loss of life the French 
suffered. Since population is an important factor in the 
future capabilities (military and economic) of a state. 
World War I greatly crippled France's future prospects. 
Although France emerged from World War I among the vic­
tors, the war had been so "close" that it was left with a 
great fear of German revenge. Since France had pursued a 
similar policy following the Franco-Prussian War, French 
statesmen readily credited Germany with planning to pursue 
the same type of policy.
The Versailles Conference met to reorder Europe follow­
ing World War I, as the Congress of Vienna had following 
the Napoleonic wars. It was here that the French attempted 
to obtain a "guarantee" of protection from Germany. At 
first the French maneuvered to have Germany dismembered. 
When the attempt to create a new "Confederation of the 
Rhine" proved unsuccessful, France, driven by the fear of a
23
united, revenge-seeking Germany, scrambled to guarantee 
its security. The terms that France had imposed upon 
Germany at Versailles were so harsh that they are often 
given credit for creating the spirit of revenge in Ger­
many that France had sought to avoid.
In compensation for the failure to dismember Germany 
France was promised by the United States and Great Britain 
a guarantee against any future German aggression. These 
alliances represented the combination of strength that had 
defeated Germany in World War I and were perceived as being 
capable of deterring another, but this security system 
quickly evaporated. The United States refused to ratify 
the Versailles Treaty, let alone the alliance with France; 
Great Britain used the excuse of the United States failure 
to participate in order to renege on its pledge. As a 
result France was left without a guarantee of protection 
against a Germany in which a spirit of revenge was being 
fostered because of the harsh terms of the "Versailles 
Diktat."
France had, in the nineteenth century, sought out its 
security in alliances with major powers. With the collapse 
of the Versailles guarantees France was again left in 
isolation, an isolation that could not be broken by the 
forming of alliances with the great powers. The United 
States and Great Britain had backed out of their commit-
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meats; Russia had fallen under the control of the Bolshevists 
and was an ideological outcast. The "French Alliance System" 
that grew up following World War I bound a weakened France 
with the weak successor states in Eastern Europe. France 
sought protection against Germany by attempting to encircle 
it as had been done before World War I; alliances were formed 
with Poland and Czechoslovakia. However, unlike its dip­
lomatic success in bringing about the Anglo-Russian rapproche­
ment in 1907, France was never able to smooth over the dif­
ferences that separated the Czechs and Poles. It was this 
failure which eventually proved the denouement of the French 
Alliance System.
The Second World War brought France’s greatest fears 
to life. The German armies disposed of the French military 
establishment with relative ease; the fall of France in 
1940 was a crushing experience for the French people. Its 
military weakness rapidly set off a "chain reaction" that 
brought down France's always instable political structure. 
Following the Franco-Prussian War the Monarchist-dominated 
Constituent Assembly established what became the Third 
Republic as a temporary expedient until they could agree 
upon a candidate for the throne. This temporary compromise 
continued to exist throughout the rest of the nineteenth 
century and into the twentieth century. Constantly shaken 
by scandals, the Third Republic began to disintegrate follow­
25
ing World War I. The new century brought an increased 
emphasis upon social welfare questions (re-enforced by the 
worldwide depression). The French government was incapable 
of meeting these demands. France combined a multi-party 
system with a parliamentary structure which, however demo­
cratic it may have been, failed to produce governments that 
could govern. A chronic state of immobilism developed in 
the inter-war years. Ministeries were formed by coalitions 
of divergent interests agreed only on narrow, short-range 
goals; major programs were too divisive to be carried out.
The governments of the inter-war years took on the character 
of a continuous series of revolving caretakers. The defeat 
of 1940 has been attributed to the failure of French leader­
ship (military and political).
The conclusion of World War II saw France in the same 
predicament that had been its fate following World War I 
(only it was worse in 1945); it was defenseless, weak and 
feared yet another German revival. French diplomacy set 
out once again on the old paths of alliance and dismember­
ment. This time it achieved a success in dismembering 
Germany as that state was partitioned into "zones of occupa­
tion." France also found success in the forming of alliances 
It quickly concluded agreements with Russia and an Anglo- 
French alliance signed at Dunkirk. Later in 1948 the Dun­
kirk Treaty was expanded into the Brussels Pact with the
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adherence of the Benelux nations to the original agreement. 
All of these diplomatic measures were designed to "control" 
Germany and protect French national security.
The emergence of the Soviet threat to Europe and the 
creation of NATO in order to meet that threat are dealt 
with in Chapter IV because of its relationship to France's 
nuclear strategy and withdrawal from NATO. The brief pre­
sentation in the above paragraphs outlines the importance 
attached to military security by the French nation. Any 
nation constantly threatened, as has been every French 
generation since the French Revolution, by military inva­
sion does not lightly ignore its security needs.
POLITICAL CULTURE AND CHARLES DE GAULLE
Political socialization is a "macro" concept in that 
it envisions a process acting upon an entire society, but 
it is well known that individuals undergo this process 
differently. The preceding section dealt with an historical 
overview that affected the entire French nation; this sec­
tion deals with the individual character of Charles de 
Gaulle. All societies, especially one as divergent as 
France, is composed of numerous individuals whose personal 
experiences impress upon them beliefs, attitudes and values 
that may differ markedly from those ascriptive of political 
culture. Since individuals bring these "macro" belief
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systems with them to the roles they fulfill in public ser­
vice, the personality of an individual decision-maker such 
as Charles de Gaulle can be of salient interest in under­
standing the actions undertaken.
Parents and family are one of the strongest elements 
in the socialization process. The de Gaulle family was 
politically attuned to the Monarchist Tradition in France. 
While the restoration of a king (Bourbon-Orleanist) is a 
primary desire of Monarchists, an underlying belief is 
that France should be governed by a strong executive. Many 
writers have compared de Gaulle's presidency in monarchial 
terms; the label of "Republican Monarchy" has often been 
ascribed to it. The Monarchist Tradition, taking its 
fundamental principles (i.e., overlooking its "kingly 
trait"), has inculcated the belief in a strong executive 
among those exposed to it. In a French society that 
enshrined a weak executive this background of Charles de 
Gaulle helps explain his willingness to set aside the 
political "norm" and to urge a strong presidency.
An appeal for a strong executive is only one example 
of wherein de Gaulle differed from the "norms" of French 
political culture. Twice, in 1940 and in 1958, de Gaulle 
denied the legitimacy of the "constitutional" government 
of France. This questioning of legitimacy is another 
heritage of the Monarchist Tradition. Originally rooted
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in the belief that the "Republic” was an unlawful usurpation, 
in modern times it has devolved into merely a questioning of 
governmental actions. Perhaps one can view this as an 
extension of Rousseauian thought; government is only the 
agency acting in behalf of the sovereign, legitimate people.
De Gaulle was born in 1890 and grew up in the pre- 
World War I era. He was subject to much of the revanche 
spirit that ran throughout France, He was trained for a 
military career and served in both world wars. These major 
events cannot have left de Gaulle uneffected. During the 
inter-war period de Gaulle taught at the French military 
academy, Saint-Cyr. Charles de Gaulle was one of the 
foremost spokesmen for military modernization, for tactics 
that were utilized by the Germans when they defeated France 
in 1940. De Gaulle had not been committed to "fighting 
the last war" and was able to clearly perceive the changes 
that necessitated readjustment of military security policy.
He brought this specialty with him when he returned to 
power in 1958 and many of his actions can be traced to 
these abilities.
CHAPTER III 
THE PATTERNS OF POWER AND INTERESTS
Le system, the military, and the civil service compose 
the three institutional groups most concerned with France’s 
military security policy. These groups are not only the 
instruments by which France’s military security policy is 
carried out, but they also are pressure groups which endeavor 
to help formulate that policy. Traditional administration 
theory makes a distinction between policy and administration, 
but that distinction is now recognized as an artificial 
"academic” tool. Those who carry out policies are not 
opinionless, beliefless creatures. They are highly involved 
and concerned with the policies they "administer." Only in 
nations where loyalty to the "rules of the game" are so strong 
(Great Britain during the labor government of 1945-1951) can 
one see "little" interference with policy by those who admin­
ister it.
Beer and Ulam’s patterns of power and interests were 
designed primarily to deal with pressure groups; governmental 
institutions were categorized with the decision-making ap­
paratus within the pattern of policy. However, the realities 
of French politics (and perhaps all political structures)
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miti ate against such an approach. A group that is institu­
tionally accorded recognition differs from an "ordinary" 
pressure group (which may be functionally represented in 
advisory committees) only in the degree of its power. It, 
of course, is charged with the administration of the partic­
ular policy, but often governments have charged private 
groups with this responsibility (the broadcast media and 
utilities in the United States). A second consideration 
is the relationships between these groups and Charles de 
Gaulle. Although the military did challenge de Gaulle, 
for the most part he was paramount within the decision­
making arena. These relationships reflect more of a pres­
sure group style than that of a co-equal partnership which 
inclusion within the decision-making process would imply.
Attitudes towards pressure groups are an element of a 
nation’s political culture. Discussion of them has been 
postponed until now in order to directly relate them to the 
events described in this chapter. From Rousseau can be 
traced a political philosophy that places great distrust in 
the activities of pressure groups as expressions only of 
"particular wills" and not of the "general will." This is 
essentially the public interest versus private interest 
argument that is fundamental in the study of pressure group 
politics. The connotations are such that the pursuance of 
particular wills are viewed as in conflict with the good of
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the whole. What occurs is that groups cloak their private 
interests with the formal trappings of public interest in 
another case of "vice paying tribute to virtue."
This rationalization of private interests (claiming 
that they are national or public interests) is an important 
element in the events described in this chapter. The insta­
bility of the French political structure enhanced this prob­
lem in that an "authoritative" institution (i.e., an agency 
that could in judge-like fashion decree what were public 
interests and what were private) did not exist. Although 
these were a French government, many of France's people did 
not accord it this authoritative role. The military espe­
cially questioned the government's attempt to do this and, 
in fact, challenged it for supremacy. It is this competition 
for supremacy in the authoritative role (usually considered 
the role of the government or state) that is the main thrust 
of this chapter. Power struggles for the control of a state 
by individuals are familiar (perhaps because of historical 
methodology), but similar struggles among institutional 
groups are not. Extensive governmental institutional groups 
(going beyond what political party terminology refer to as 
the "cadre" stage of development to a "branch" or "mass" 
structure) are a phenomenon of the modern state.
This paper deals with the three institutional groups 
(le system, the military, and the civil service) as if they
32
were unified. This is obviously an academic "fiction" that 
is utilized because of the convenience it affords. Groups 
are almost always divisible into sub-groups or factions that 
compete with one another. When, in the course of this paper, 
the group name is used, it is as a shortened title for the 
dominate faction within the group (e.g., instead of saying 
the "Revolutionary Warfare Faction within the Army portion 
of the military," the term "the military" is used). Often 
the defeat of a "group" is attributable more to the combina­
tion of its non-dominate factions (in alliance with outside 
"groups") than of the strength of other groups. Wherever 
this is the case it is noted. Confusion, of course, arises 
because factions within groups like groups within a society 
tend to claim to represent the "general will."
^  SYSTEM
The term system" is applied to the elected officials 
who held power during the Fourth Republic. It also includes 
the functionaries or courtiers that attached themselves to 
this political core. The Fourth Republic, like the Third 
Republic, was structured within a parliamentary framework.
The legislature was the center of power with the president 
being a ceremonial position without much real power and the 
"Government" or Ministries being responsible to the Chamber 
of Deputies. Although this framework "parallels" that in
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Great Britain, it was far more weaker in fact due to the 
operation of a multi-party system within France. The di­
versity that was described in the chapter on political 
culture has lead France to develop an electoral system in 
which a half dozen or more ’’major‘d political parties com­
pete for legislative seats.
French voters actively supported the myriad of political 
parties and were so "evenly" distributed in their support 
that no one of them could ever achieve a majority as the re­
sult of an election. This meant that governments had to be 
formed from coalitions worked out within the legislature and 
were not "ready-made" as in Great Britain (the election en­
trusting a party with a majority). The multi-party system 
further complicated this task in that the parties were often 
committed to many divergent policies. Because no party 
could obtain a majority electorally (and, therefore, be ex­
pected to carry out its program), "rash" and "irresponsible" 
promises were often made in order to attract voters. Once 
these positions were taken, it was hard (especially in that 
fiercely competitive atmosphere) to back down from them.
Since they were often made in order to distinguish the party 
from parties with similar ideological beliefs, this made it 
difficult for stable coalitions to be formed. It is easy to 
imagine the difficulty of coalition formation among parties 
of competing ideologies. Yet, the same process applied with
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parties that were ideologically similar [Left, Right, Workers, 
etc.). Other cleavages often divided these parties.
The result was that the Fourth Republic was a republic 
of immobilism. Coalitions were formed to deal with specific 
problems. When new problems arose, the coalitions often dis­
solved because the parties were in disagreement over how to 
solve it. This would necessitate a new coalition being formed 
that could agree on how to solve the new problem. It, in 
turn, would come apart when another problem arose. Because 
the coalitions were also "responsible" for the political 
direction of the government, the rapid turnover resulted in 
an abdication of leadership. During the twelve years of the 
Fourth Republic twenty-three premiers held office,^ (tenure 
in other ministries was often of longer duration). These 
governments seldom stayed in office long enough to get a 
"handle" on things and were subsequently caretaker in nature.
Another element of the immobilism that affected the 
Fourth Republic was the personal ambition of many of the 
politicians involved. The multi-party legislature made it 
easy for pressure groups to wield influence. The Third 
Republic (with a similar political structure) was repeatedly 
rocked with scandals involving the seedy side of lobbying
^David Thomson, Democracy in France Since 1870 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1969) , p. 240.
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and influence peddling. This reputation was carried over 
into the Fourth Republic. Whether or not it went as far as 
it had during the Third Republic (or to the extent in the 
Fifth Republic) is not that important; the major point is 
that the French National Assembly because of the democratic 
nature of the electoral system, was prone to represent and 
respond to pressure groups. The French deputies were also 
relatively secure in their offices; this enabled them to 
engage in much "politicking." Governments were often over­
thrown for no other reason than that a group of ambitious 
politicians wanted to have office (or improve their position). 
A cabalistic atmosphere pervaded the Fourth Republic. Getting 
into office and staying in became objectives in themselves.
Because of these reasons the Fourth Republic acquired
the opprobrium of the French people, and it was with such
connotations that the term "1^ system" was used. The
Fourth Republic's beginning had not been propitious to
start with. The first attempt at approving a constitution
had been defeated. The second constitution, which passed,
received only 9,120,576 votes to 7,980,333 while 7 , 938 ,884
2voters abstained. The Fourth Republic began without the 
confidence of a majority of the French people and its actions 
did nothing to change that.
^Thomson, p. 237.
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The immobilism resulted in the other institutions of 
government [technically responsible to the political govern­
ment) such as the military and the civil service taking over 
the direction of policy that had been abdicated by system. 
The Fourth Republic was brought to an end when one of the 
political leaders attempted (actually only an implied threat) 
to regain control of the decision-making process. Although 
le system was generally despised, there were "within" it 
reformist factions. system had deftly avoided the
Algerian crisis for a number of years (actually a few 
governments had collapsed over their inability to solve 
it). Actual power with concern to Algerian policy had been 
allowed to flow to the military (which will be dealt with 
more fully in the next section of this chapter). In May, 
1958, Pierre Pflimlin, upon becoming premier, set out to 
settle the Algerian problem. He was invested with the 
premiership on May 13, 1958; the army in Algeria revolted
3on the same day. The French generals in control of the 
Algerian policy did not favor negotiating with the Algerian 
rebels because they thought this would lead to an independent 
Algeria; a situation which they opposed. Pierre Pflimlin 
was willing to open negotiations with the rebels; it was 
for this reason that the revolt was staged.
3Lowell Noonan, France : The Politics of Continuity in 
Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. T i l .
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The army in Algeria [dealt with in the next section 
under the term '^Revolutionary Warfare" faction) dominated 
the military establishment even though it was numerically 
a minority even within the army. It was able to achieve 
its aims by "neutralizing" the other elements of coercisive 
force. It appealed to the "unity of the army." Its success 
was not as much due to the support the Revolution Warfare 
doctrine held within the army as to the lack of support for 
the Fourth Republic and I2  system.
Pflimlin's government discovered that the 
military units in metropolitan France and 
West Germany were not prepared to use force 
or even demonstrations of force to bar the 
insurrection from the mainland . . . .  Most 
units, it was feared only awaited some sign 
that the rebels would succeed before they 
helped to pull down the rickety political 
structure. The invasion of Corsica, publi­
cized plans for paratroop drops around Paris, 
and De Gaulle's announcement that he was be­
ginning the process of forming a government 
therefore provided sufficient motivation for 
the Fourth Republic to commit s u i c i d e . 4
The unpopularity of ^  system combined with the emergence 
of an alternative (Charles de Gaulle) in which to invest 
France's legitimacy enabled the military to pull off its 
coup d'etat.
4Edgar Furniss, De_ Gaulle and the French Army : A 
Crisis in Civil-Military Relations (New York: The Twen- 
tiethCentury Fund, 1964), p. 1Û4.
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The Revolutionary Warfare faction had been able to 
initiate the coup d 'grâce of the Fourth Republic because 
of its unpopularity. Yet the Revolutionary Warfare faction 
lacked the support itself to assume control of the govern­
ment and set up a military junta. If it had tried, a civil 
war may have been the result. For this reason it accepted 
Charles de Gaulle’s assumption of power believing that he 
shared their Algerian views.
The constitution of the Fifth Republic transferred 
the center of power from the National Assembly to the 
presidency. The creation of a strong presidency enabled the 
Fifth Republic to survive its own confrontation with the 
military three years later. Although the elected officials 
under the Fifth Republic were concerned with the issues of 
foreign and defense policy (in fact, for the most part they 
were the "same” individuals that had held office under the 
Fourth Republic), the transference of decision-making power 
to the presidency reduced the affect that they could have 
upon it.
The members of the National Assembly were never able to 
recover this power during Charles de Gaulle's presidency.
The reputation of ^  system clung to them. Fears of immo­
bilism and chaos were levied against them whenever they 
attempted to reclaim powers. De Gaulle identified the 
National Assembly with the particular interests and deputies
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of Rousseau’s thought. He had nothing but contempt for them 
(although he was forced to put up with them) and preferred, 
perhaps reflecting a combination of Rousseauian and Monarchist 
Traditions, to rule through plebiscites. He expressed this 
belief in his Memoirs of Hope :
Now, while I was convinced that sovereignty 
belongs to the people, provided they express 
themselves directly and as a whole, I refuse 
to accept that it could be parcelled out 
among the different interests represented 
by the parties . . . .  But in order that the 
State should be, as it must be, the instru­
ment of French unity, of the higher interests 
of the country, of continuity in national 
policy, I considered it necessary for the 
government to derive not from parliament, 
in other words the parties, but, over and 
above them, from a leader directly mandated 
by the nation as a whole and empowered to 
choose, to decide and to act.S
De Gaulle utilized the plebiscite throughout his presidency 
to give substance to this belief. His success in doing so 
(until April, 1969) enabled him to relegate the National 
Assembly (the location of ^  system) to a secondary role.
The National Assembly provided de Gaulle with support 
through most of his presidency; it was not a rampant center 
of opposition. Yet, it was within the National Assembly 
that the members of the Fourth Republic’s 3^ system congregated 
and where opposition did voice itself to de Gaulle’s policies.
^Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope : Renewal and Endeavor 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 197T), p. 6.
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THE MILITARY
The military establishment of a nation is the instrument 
of its defense. With its civil service counterpart it admin­
isters the totality of government policy. The problem that 
arises is due to the fact that policy-administration dichotomy 
is an academic tool for separating facts and values in issues 
that are dealt with by single individuals. Administrators 
have beliefs, values, and attitudes too; they cannot be ex­
pected not to (they can be expected to place the enforcement 
of legitimate directives above these personal beliefs). When 
administrators "forget" their role and ignore the legitimate 
societal policy-making apparatus, a "conflict of interests" 
arises. This is what occurred with the military during the 
Fourth Republic. The military not only was the instrument 
for the French Algerian policy but a major advocate of a 
specific Algerian policy (continued union with France).
The French army has had a traditional role in the admin­
istration of colonies. It played a major role in the crea­
tion of the French overseas empire following the Franco- 
Prussian War in 1871. The military provided many of the 
colonial administrators and thereby acquired a heritage 
of solving political problems. The colonial wars fought 
to preserve this empire increased the importance of the 
military as political administrators.^ The French army's
^Bernard Brown, "The Army and Politics in France," The 
Journal of Politics, XXVI, 2 (May, 1961), p. 276.
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major mission was not combative but administrative. This 
predominance of the administrative function lead "the Army 
(to acquire) psychological, paternalistic and political in-
7terests in the French Empire," When the "winds of change" 
began to sweep that empire away, the French army became more 
desperate in its futile efforts to preserve what remained.
Algeria became a symbol of that empire (it was the first 
area that had been conquered) at the same time as the Fourth 
Republic was sinking deeper and deeper into its immobilism. 
With the government’s reluctance or inability to solve the 
Algerian problem the military eagerly took over direction of 
policy. The army's initial military activities were soon 
superceded as the war in Algeria became more intense. Com­
mitted to the victory of its own policy, the army assumed 
total control of French policy towards Algeria.
The counterpart to its efforts to predeter­
mine what single policy would emerge from 
the political process was the army's practice 
of interpreting, even reconstructing, decisions 
taken by the government so that they would 
mean what supporters of French Algeria wanted 
them to mean. Favorable pieces were taken out 
of context and construed to be the whole policy. 
Negative elements, qualifications, nuances were ignored.8
It was the weakness and uncertainty of the political leaders
Ronald Stupak, "The Military's Ideological Challenge 
to Civilian Authority in Post-World War II France," Orbis, 
XII, 2 (Summer, 1968), p. 584.
Bpurniss, p. 82.
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in Paris that made the assumption of policy-making powers 
by the army in Algeria so easy. It was because of this 
weakness that the political leaders failed in their con­
frontation with the military and brought on the demise of 
the Fourth Republic.
The French army continued to aggregate authority to 
itself. It extended the scope of its concerns beyond the 
realm of military affairs and into social and political 
questions.
With the autonomy of decision and its expanded 
role in Indochina as a precedent, the army 
cast itself upon the Algerian people and 
sought to mold them into a contented, peaceful, 
prosperous society controlled by France. So 
weak were the institutions of the Fourth Re­
public, so divided the counsels of its leaders, 
that the army, in its fantastic endeavor, had 
come by 1958 to assume for the most part full 
powers, untrammelled by civilian direction, 
not responsible to political authority.9
An "ideological” content emerged within the army’s goals for 
Algeria.
As has been previously mentioned, the French military 
was dominated by the Revolutionary Warfare faction. This 
group of officers and enlisted men, mainly within the con­
ventional combat forces of the army, subscribed to a doctrine 
that coupled military strategy with social action. The vast
^Furniss, p. 24.
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bulk o£ the French military establishment did not share these 
beliefs, but because those who did occupied the key combat, 
staff and training positions. Revolutionary Warfare dominated 
French military thinking. The French army underwent a dras­
tic transformation following World War II. Thrown into a 
series of disasterous colonial wars, especially the one in 
Indochina, many officers arrived at the conclusion that the 
only way in which the French Empire could be preserved was 
if the army directly assumed political p o w e r s . T h i s  doc­
trine appealed greatly to the army's combat elements who 
viewed their own position vis à vis other elements of the 
military and their continued existence as dependent upon the 
preservation of the French Empire. The empire justified the 
maintenance of a large conventional force.
The French defeat in Indochina was a tremendous shock, 
especially for the military leaders who were confident in 
their technical superiority. The military underwent a pro­
cess of introspection from which the Revolutionary Warfare 
doctrine (so called because it was meant to be counter­
revolutionary) emerged as an explanation of France's defeat. 
France's military capabilities were not faulted; Revolutionary 
Warfare posited that France's defeat had stemmed from political
^®Jean-Marie Domenach, "The French Army in Politics," 
Foreign Affairs, XXXIX, 2 (January, 1961), p. 187.
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factors beyond the control of the military. Ho Chi Minh’s 
success in Indochina was attributed to the strong appeal 
that "his Marxist-Leninist ideology" had because of its social 
welfare considerations. The failure of the French government 
to meet the socio-economic needs of the Indochinese peoples 
provided the vehicle by which Ho Chi Minh was enabled to 
ride to power.
Social action is a basic function of modern governments. 
The determination of social welfare policy is a political 
function and in the Western democracies is a task carried 
out by the elected representatives of the people. The Revolu­
tionary Warfare faction claimed that the army should possess 
this function if it was to preserve the French Empire.
Attached to the fundamental decision to assume the political 
function was the ordering of specific policies by which the 
social welfare demands of France's colonial people's were to 
be met. Revolutionary Warfare combined within the military's 
authoritarian structure a program of socio-economic reforms 
much akin to those advocated by various socialist groups.
(Yet, it was actively anti-communist politically.)
It was the Revolutionary Warfare group which lead the 
army into assuming political authority in Algeria. It was 
composed not only of France's elite combat troops (who were 
fighting the war in Algeria) but of most of the "general 
staff." It was this domination of the "general staff" (and
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the military schools, such as Saint-Cyr) which enabled the 
Revolutionary Warfare faction to speak authoritatively in 
the name of the army and of the whole military. Opposition 
to the doctrine could be and was considered a threat to the 
"unity of the army" and to the legitimate military institu­
tion (and, interestingly, to the government itself). By 
imposing itself between the government and the rest of the 
bulk of the military, the Revolutionary Warfare faction was 
able to sever the legitimate channel of communications 
connecting these two groups. Since most of the army was 
dissatisfied with 3^ system, the government was unable to 
eliciate any support from them when the crisis came in 
May, 1958.
The Revolutionary Warfare faction, in de facto control 
of French Algerian policy, rebelled when Pierre Pflimlin 
posed a challenge to their continued exercise of authority.
. . . since the Army saw itself as the em­
bodiment of the national will, it believed 
that any persons or groups disagreeing with 
its ideological interpretation of the national 
and international scenes were necessarily 
traitors or communist agents. It felt that 
it had to have power to make its voice heard 
at all levels, to carry out its national de­
fense mission, and to look after the nation's 
destiny.11
It not only removed Pflimlin but the Fourth Republic as well;
^^Stupak, p. 593.
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it hoped by this means to guarantee its continued control 
over Algerian policy.
Charles de Gaulle's assumption o£ power, although the 
result of the coup d'etat carried out by the Revolutionary 
Warfare faction,was not as a spokesman (or leader) for that 
group. De Gaulle's supporters had urged his acceptance upon 
the disparate elements within the military as a means of 
avoiding a civil war. The last days of May, 1958 were filled 
with the tension of crisis. While the overthrow of the 
Fourth Republic by the Revolutionary Warfare faction was 
readily accepted, the attempt by that group to establish 
a military junta (if it had desired to do so) would have 
met with opposition. De Gaulle, whose beliefs concerning 
Algeria were in conjunction with the Revolutionary Warfare 
faction's at that time, offered an alternative to chaos and 
civil war. By turning to him the impasse created by the 
coup d'etat was overcome. Charles de Gaulle, possessing 
great personal prestige, could unify the various groups 
behind his government.
De Gaulle represented a compromise similar to that 
which had resulted in the adoption of the Third Republic; 
he divided France the least. De Gaulle assumed office 
believing in a French Algeria; his experiences in office 
lead him to change that viewpoint. De Gaulle came to 
accept the necessity of negotiating with the Algerian rebels
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(and, by implication, the independence of Algeria) as the 
only solution to the Algerian problem. This is precisely 
the reason for which the army had overthrown the Fourth 
Republic.
. . . there is little evidence that De Gaulle 
deliberately set out to fight the Algerian 
army which had placed him in power. De 
Gaulle’s ambiguities, shifts, and retreats 
are more logically explained as reactions to 
unanticipated obduragy encountered in his 
dealings with both the Moslem nationalists .2 
and the military-European alliance in Algeria.
The reaction of the Revolutionary Warfare faction was shock, 
As de Gaulle’s policy unfolded they turned from disbelief 
and anger to opposition.
. . .  it was De Gaulle’s consummate ability 
to out-maneuver the army that most aroused 
military anger. The army had thought it was 
installing an effective and willing prompter 
of its Algerian policy. What it got was a 
President who, behind a smoke-screen of pub­
lic contradiction and ambiguity, sidled down 
the very path of "abandonment" from which the 
army had barred the Fourth R e p u b l i c . 13
The Revolutionary Warfare faction proposed to settle this 
problem in the same manner as it had dealt with the Fourth 
Republic--by coup d ’etat.
^^Furniss, pp. 177-178. 
^^Ibid., p. 69.
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The General's Revolt in 1961 was essentially a repeti­
tion of the May, 1958 coup d'etat except that it failed. The 
strength of the Revolutionary Warfare faction was unable to 
dispose of the Fifth Republic as it had of the Fourth Repub­
lic. The strength of the Revolutionary Warfare faction had 
not changed since 1958; it was due to "external" changes 
that it failed. Instead of opposing a weak, vacillating 
Fourth Republic, it confronted a revitalized Fifth Republic 
lead by Charles de Gaulle. The massive passitivity that 
had been shown over the fate of the Fourth Republic by the 
French people was no longer a condition favoring the Revolu­
tionary Warfare faction.
De Gaulle, on assuming office in 1958, undertook to 
"modernize" the French military; it is this modernization 
policy represented by the creation of the Force Nucléaire 
Stratégique that is at the heart of this paper. It was 
undertaken not only to revitalize the French military but 
to re-direct it into safe channels away from the Revolutionary 
Warfare d o c t r i n e . W h i l e  France maintained its empire, there 
was a need for a large conventional force. This force, as 
the events of 1958 clearly demonstrated, also posed as a 
potential threat to civilian governmental authority. Al­
though the French Empire served as the main justification
^^Elizabeth Stabler, "French Military Policy," Current 
History, L, 296 (April, 1966), p. 233.
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for the maintenance of a large field army, France's security 
needs because of NATO and the Soviet "threat" also played 
an important role. The loss of its empire did not necessarily 
mean the reduction of its military forces and of the domestic 
threat that they composed. The Force Nucléaire Stratégique 
was designed to accomplish this task. By providing a technical 
alternative to France's security needs, de Gaulle was able to 
reduce the size of the army from the 820,000 men that had 
been required while the Algerian problem remained unsolved 
to a force of 330,000 men at the time he left office.
These reductions occurred among the conventional combat 
forces.
The reduction of the French army (and its conversion to 
modernization) did not begin until after 1962. These reduc­
tions did not affect the strength of the Revolutionary War­
fare faction during its struggle with de Gaulle. They only 
occurred after it had been vanquished and were designed 
to prevent a future recurrence of a challenge to civilian 
authority. Since most of France's generals had derived 
their experiences (and promotions) from the colonial wars, 
the reduction of the size of the army enabled de Gaulle to 
remove many of these men who were tainted by the Revolutionary 
Warfare d o c t r i n e . C o u p l e d  with the reduction of conven-
^^The Statesman's Yearbook, 1958-1970. 
^^Furniss, pp. 178-179.
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tional forces this broke up a major center of opposition to 
de Gaulle’s policies.
These events occurred after the failure of the Revolu­
tionary Warfare faction to destroy the Fifth Republic and 
Charles de Gaulle and were designed to protect the govern­
ment from future threats. What enabled de Gaulle to defeat 
the Revolutionary Warfare faction in the first place was 
his winning over of important elements within the army, 
air force, and navy to his modernization policy. Neither 
the air force nor the navy suffered a decline in numerical 
strength during de Gaulle’s presidency. The restructuring 
of France’s military security policy around the Force 
Nucléaire Stratégique gave a central role to these two 
services. France utilized both surface-to-surface missiles 
and sea-to-surface missiles within its nuclear force. The 
navy, air force, and younger army officer with technical 
backgrounds achieved new prominence and prestige under de
Gaulle. These men were engineers, administrators and
17technicians more than they were military men. Their 
commitment to Charles de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic 
foredoomed the Generals’ Revolt in 1961. The Revolutionary 
Warfare faction based in Algeria could not threaten metro­
politan France without the service support (transportation.
17Domenach, p. 193.
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communication, supply, etc.) controlled by the air force 
and the navy.
THE CIVIL SERVICE
The role of the civil service throughout the process 
was highly invisible. As the civilian counterpart of the 
military, it is possessed with great strength. Its invis­
ibility was perhaps due to the fact that the policies being 
followed by de Gaulle were essentially their policies.
It was the civil service that had initiated the French 
nuclear program following the disaster of Suez in 1956.
De Gaulle’s endorsement of it helped win them over to the 
Fifth Republic. The civil service had shared the general 
distrust and disgust with the Fourth Republic’s lê  system.
The governments of the Fifth Republic were more to its lik­
ing because they were composed of men drawn from the civil 
service. An examination of the three offices of premier, 
foreign minister, and defense minister (those concerned with 
military security policy) shows that between 1959 and 1969 
these offices were occupied by men with administrative or 
civil service backgrounds*^^ Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Michel Debré, 
Georges Pompidou, Maurice Couve de Murville, Pierre Messmer 
and Pierre Guillaumat all came from technical or administra-
^^The Statesman’s Yearbook, 1958-1970.
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tive careers. The other ministries, to a lesser extent, 
drew upon the civil service to fill their top level posi­
tions. The civil service's role within the Fifth Republic 
has obviously been salient, but its congruence with the 
policies of Charles de Gaulle makes the necessity for a 
lengthy discussion of its activities superfluous.
CHAPTER IV 
THE PATTERN OF POLICY
Policy, its formulation and implementation, is the cul­
mination of the patterns of government. Policies emerge 
from the play of powers and interests upon the decision­
making instruments of the society. This paper focuses upon 
the change in military security policy undertaken during 
the years of Charles de Gaulle's presidency. The institu­
tional groups most concerned with the national security 
[described in the preceding chapter) were either in agree­
ment [e.g., the civil service, the air force, and the navy) 
with the creation of the Force Nucléaire Stratégique or else 
were thrawted in their opposition [e.g., the Revolutionary 
Warfare faction and lê  system) . With the establishment of 
the Fifth Republic Charles de Gaulle declared the areas of 
foreign policy and defense policy were matters exclusively 
within the domaine reserve of the French president.^ French 
policy became the expression of Charles de Gaulle's beliefs. 
Although he was supported quite actively by the civil service 
in his endeavors, the principal role in decision-making was 
his. That there was so "little" disagreement over this is
^Anthony Hartley, Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Polit­
ical Movement [New York: Outerbridge § Dienstfrey, 1971), p. 196.
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probably due to two factors. First, de Gaulle provided 
stability to the French government. The civil service 
valued this highly because it is essential for the effic­
ient administration of the state. As long as the only 
alternative to de Gaulle was chaos and possible civil 
war, very few men were reluctant to challenge his authority. 
Second, de Gaulle's actions can be said to have been de­
rived from the deductive premises of his background and 
professional training. Since the deductive process is 
dependent upon the initial premises, the civil service 
and military reformists differed little from de Gaulle 
because he was "one of them."
THE COLD WAR
The Second World War left Europe in shambles. The 
powerless, weakened states of Western Europe were faced 
with an ambitious Soviet state. The Western European 
nations lacked the military strength to stop a massive 
Soviet attack, but overt aggression was not the only thing 
that produced fear in the West. The Soviet actions through­
out Eastern Europe alarmed them to the threats of covert
2Soviet pressure. The Atlantic Alliance was created to
John McCloy, The Atlantic Alliance : Its Origin and Its 
Future [New York: distributed by Columbia University Press, 
Carnegie-Mellon University, 1969), p. 40.
55
bolster the Western European states and, if necessary, to 
defend them. It was offered as a visible symbol of the 
West’s determination to remain free.^
Events elsewhere in the world soon began to transform 
the Atlantic Alliance. The Communist invasion of South 
Korea resulted in demands for more ’’concrete" measures of 
defense to be undertaken by the Atlantic Alliance’s members. 
The heightened fear of Soviet aggression made the Atlantic 
Alliance’s mutual guarantees appear as an insufficient 
deterrent. In September, 1950, in a protocol to the Atlantic 
Alliance the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was estab­
lished . ̂
De Gaulle later described NATO as the symbol of the 
American protectorate exercised over Western Europe.^ In 
retrospect the terms "protectorate" and "sphere of influ­
ence" probably best reflect the reality and flavor of the 
Cold War years with regard to Western Europe. The Western 
European states had yet to recover from the effects of the 
Second World War. Their conventional military establishment
William Fox and Annette Fox, NATO and the Range of 
American Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 
p . 34.
^Fox and Fox, pp. 14-15.
^France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign
Policy: 1966, "Press Conference Held by Charles de Gaulle
(excerpts), February 21, 1966," p. 20.
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suffered from too great an imbalance vis-à-vis the Soviet 
Union to have any hope of stopping a Soviet attack; only 
nuclear weapons could do that.^ A Soviet attack on Western 
Europe was deterred by the American threat of "massive 
retaliation." This threat in no way eminated from NATO; 
America's nuclear forces were all outside of the NATO system. 
The United States directly protected Western Europe. The 
role reserved for NATO (besides the symbolism of allied troop 
contributions) was that of "controlling" Western Europe; 
i.e., for preventing any of the Western European nations 
from "triggering" a Soviet-American war. NATO was the formal 
notice of the United States assumption of "responsibility" 
for Western Europe analogous to the assumption of respons­
ibility for Latin America exercised by the United States in 
the late nineteenth century.
THE NUCLEAR QUESTION
As long as the Western European states perceived the 
Soviet Union as a threat and the United States as capable 
and willing to deter that threat, NATO with its implications 
of "protectorate" was accepted by them. The Soviet Union 
was incapable of attacking the United States with either
^Paul Stehlin, "The Evolution of Western Defense," 
Foreign Affairs, XXXXII, 1 (October, 1963), p. 74.
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conventional or nuclear weapons while the United States 
could attack the Soviet Union. This arrangement, which 
entailed little risk for the United States, made the Amer­
ican nuclear guarantee an effective deterrent. The Western 
European states accepted their client-state status in ex­
change for the protection afforded them by the United States. 
That a real belief in the commonality of their interests 
during these years existed does not distract (although it 
does tend to make it more palatable) from this relationship.
The late 1950's saw the American nuclear guarantee 
first dissipated and finally broken. America's willingness 
to defend Western Europe (and the belief in a commonality 
of interests) was first challenged by the Suez crisis in 
1956. Great Britain and France undertook the invasion of 
Egypt with the assumption that the United States was in 
"support" of their action. When this proved not to be the 
case. Great Britain and France found themselves outside the 
"perimeter" of American defense. Although the Soviet Union 
possessed a nuclear capability at this time, its delivery 
system was not sufficient for it to threaten the United 
States. However, it could rain down nuclear destruction 
anywhere in Western Europe. The Russian role in the Suez 
crisis was minimal and secondary at most, but taken in 
conjunction with American actions it provides a significant
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premonition of what the future held. The Soviet Union 
blandished the threat of nuclear attack at Great Britain 
and France if they did not withdraw from Egypt. The United 
States, also desiring an Anglo-French withdrawal from Egypt, 
did not come to the defense of its allies; it did not counter 
the Soviet threat with its own threat of massive retalia-
7tion. The shock occasioned by the knowledge that their 
interests could differ so substantially (and result in the 
withdrawal of the American nuclear guarantee) served as a 
catalyst for the construction of the French Force Nucléaire 
Stratégique.̂  The French (and British) came to realize that 
their interests and American interests were not entirely 
identical. The realization that the American guarantee was 
dependent upon French "good behavior" or subservience to 
American interests set in motion the events that culminated 
in France's nuclear force and in its reassertion of inde­
pendence under Charles de Gaulle.
Within a few years of Suez the American guarantee was 
broken by the Soviet deployment of a missile delivery 
system capable of striking the United States itself. Suez 
demonstrated that the United States could willfully deny
7Guy de Carmoy, The Foreign Policies of France, 1944- 
1968 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) , p. 52.
^Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., published for the Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1965), pp. 106-107.
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the protection of its nuclear weapons; the Soviet inter­
continental strike capability raised the question as to 
whether or not the United States could now willfully ex­
tend its protection to any other nation. The vulnerability
of the United States transformed the realities of world 
qpolitics. The premises upon which the American nuclear 
guarantee had been based were no longer applicable.
De Gaulle’s return to power occurred shortly after 
these events had transpired. Firmly intending upon govern­
ing France, he readily perceived that the conditions affect­
ing world politics had changed. These new conditions dic­
tated that France undertake a major reappraisal and readjust­
ment of its military security policy. France’s defense, like 
that of the other Western European states, had been based 
upon the unconditional, absolute American nuclear guarantee. 
This situation no longer existed. Although France could rely 
upon American protection whenever the United States deemed its 
own paramount interests at stake, for those instances when 
this was not the case some other means had to be found in 
order to provide France with the necessary guarantee of 
security. This other means was the Force Nucléaire Stratégique, 
The French nuclear force was justified as the replacement
9Theo Sommer, ”How Many Fingers on How Many Triggers?" 
The Atlantic Community Quarterly, I, 4 [Winter, 1963-64), 
pp. 556-557r
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for the "failed" American guarantee. This "failure" of the 
American nuclear deterrent was a constant theme presented 
by de Gaulle in his statements on France's nuclear program.
But at the same time as the alarms were dying 
down, there was also a reduction in the guar­
antee of security--one might say absolute-- 
that the possession of the nuclear weapon by 
America alone gave to the Old Continent, and 
in the certainty that America would employ it, 
without reservation, in the event of aggres­
sion. For Soviet Russia has since that time 
equipped itself with a nuclear power capable 
of striking the United States directly, which 
has made the decisions of the Americans as to 
the eventual use of th^ir bombs at least 
indeterminate . . .
The loss of the American nuclear guarantee was not some­
thing which was perceived merely by the supporters of Charles 
de Gaulle. The realization of this occurrence permeated the 
entire French "elite." Rene Pleven, who had been one of the 
Fourth Republic’s premiers, is an example of the pervasiveness 
of this understanding (Pleven, it should be noted, later 
held office within the Gaullist ministries); he wrote early 
in de Gaulle’s presidency that:
Some of those who realized the gravity of the 
threat which the Soviets now held over the free 
world began to wonder if there was not a risk 
that the guarantee of nuclear intervention 
hitherto so generously offered by the United
France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign
Policy : 1966, "Press Conference Held by Charles de Gaulle
(excerpts), February 21, 1966," p. 20.
61
States to all the free peoples might not 
one day be limited to the stakes which the 
American public considered most essential 
to its own security.11
De Gaulle was not faced with the task of convincing the French 
that they were indeed faced with a security problem; this was 
already widely accepted. By the time he returned to power, 
the argument had devolved from the stage of definition to 
that of seeking out a possible solution. The Force Nucléaire 
Stratégique was offered as a solution to a recognized and 
well understood problem.
De Gaulle adopted the nuclear program as the best means 
by which to address France's military security problem. Con­
sequently he accelerated the development of France’s nuclear
12weapons program. His actions,when taken in conjunction with 
the subsequent withdrawal of France from NATO,have often been 
described as rash and inappropriate. A careful examination 
of the situation reveals that this is not the case. De Gaulle, 
through his life’s work, had demonstrated his loyalty to France 
and its security. His early career had been that of a ’’mili­
tary intellectual" devoted to the study of military strategy. 
Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville in a speech before 
the National Assembly enunciated on this reputation. He said:
^^René Pleven, "France in the Atlantic Community," 
Foreign Affairs, XXXVIII, 1 [October, 1959), p. 25.
l^Hartley, p. 197.
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. . . everyone is well aware, consciously or 
unconsciously, that the quarrel is not mili­
tary, but political. The best proof of this 
is that no one, either in France or abroad, 
has sincerely felt that our Government, in 
doing what it has just decided, was endanger­
ing its own defense or that of its allies.
Who, moreover, would imagine that General 
de Gaulle himself would at any time assume 
responsibility for anything that would be 
likely to jeopardize the nation's security?
The political nature of this question is more evident when 
the military considerations are analyzed.
French security is ultimately guaranteed by the United 
States. The strategic importance of France is such that it 
would benefit from the protection afforded the United States 
to its other European allies. The loss of France due to 
aggression (not as the result of retaliation for actions it 
had taken elsewhere) would not be in the national interests 
of the United States. In such a case (unprovoked aggression) 
the United States would, regardless of treaty delegations, be 
forced to protect F r a n c e . T h e  Force Nucléaire Stratégique * s 
function was to fill the gap between American interests and 
French interests. The nuclear striking force's purpose was 
to guarantee France the ability to pursue an active policy 
without the fear of "nuclear blackmail." It was the memory
13France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign
Policy: 1966, "Speech by M. Couve de Murville before the
National Assembly: April 14, 1966," p. 51.
^^Kissinger, p. 17.
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of Suez and not of the Fall of France which provided the 
motivation behind France's nuclear program.
The French military security policy is defensively 
orientated; with the liquidation of its empire this has 
become even more so. France has suffered two great invasions 
in this century alone. The World Wars wrecked great destruc­
tion upon France. The desire for military security is aimed 
primarily at preserving France from yet another invasion.
The post-World War II era introduced the threat of nuclear 
"invasion" to the fears that play upon the minds of French 
statesmen. The American nuclear guarantee,while it had 
been operative, had protected France from the threat of 
invasion. It was this security that was sought in seeking 
a replacement for the no longer operative American guarantee. 
Premier Georges Pompidou said that:
Our basic effort is the deterrent force, be­
cause we consider that above all we must save 
peace, our peace, and not be attacked. The 
only way not to be attacked is to have a suf­
ficiently powerful atomic arsenal; the day we 
have a sufficient atomic arsenal, including 
the hydrogen bomb, well, France will never be.g 
attacked again. This is what is fundamental.
Defense was the primary military function envisioned for the
15France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign
Policy : 1966, "Televised Interview of M. Pompidou [excerpts]:
September 26̂ , 1966," p. 117.
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Force Nucléaire Stratégique. It would prevent France from 
being "sold out" in a confrontation between the superpowers 
by giving it something to "bargain" with.
The Force Nucléaire Stratégique also served a number 
of non-defensive interests. Its use to convert the army 
away from the Revolutionary Warfare doctrine has already 
been described in the preceding chapter. Another important 
aspect that de Gaulle felt could be derived from the nuclear 
program was the stimulation of the French economy from 
scientific "spin-offs." The modern technology ancillary 
to a nuclear weapons program (communications, computer 
systems, etc.) is adaptable to the needs of civilian indus­
tries. It was also associated with France's mystique of 
glory and honor. The possession of nuclear weapons was 
viewed as a symbol of Great Power status; a status de Gaulle 
felt that France rightfully possessed.
. . .  a French atomic deterrent force is 
coming into existence and is going to grow 
continuously. It is a relatively modest 
force, it is true, but one which is chang­
ing and will completely change, the condi­
tions of our own defense, those of our 
intervention in faraway lands and those 
of the contribution that we would be able 
to make to the safeguard of our a l l i e s .
France, French Embassy, New York, Major Addresses, 
Statements and Press Conferehces of Genera1 CharTes de Gaulie 
May 19, 19SF^ahUary 51, 1564, "Sixth Press Conference held 
by General de Gaulle as President of the French Republic in 
Paris at the Elysee Palace on May 15, 1962," p. 180.
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These subsidiary reasons added depth to the Force Nucléaire 
Stratégique * s military purpose.
An important military question was whether or not 
France was capable of constructing a credible deterrent 
force. The effectiveness of a deterrent is an unmeasure- 
able quality for it is unknown when not used and a failure 
when it has to be. It was readily admitted that a force 
similar in scope to that of either the United States or the 
Soviet Union was beyond the economic capabilities of France, 
but such a force was not required in order to provide France 
with a credible deterrent. France did not require the arsenal 
of a superpower; the adopting of a "porcupine strategy" ade­
quately satisfied its needs. The porcupine is a small, weak, 
slow animal that could easily be overwhelmed by any of a 
number of much larger predators, but the porcupine is able 
to deter its potential predators. The porcupine's quills 
protect it from being eaten not because they represent a 
superior strength but because they make the effort too 
"costly." It was this strategy that France adopted. Defense 
Minister Michel Debre enunciated this view in explaining why 
France did not need to achieve parity with the superpowers.
For it is clear that to deter a would-be 
aggressor does not require parity of nuclear 
armament, but simply the ability to bring 
to bear on him a threat proportionate to the
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importance he attaches to the desired 
conquest.17
Whenever French and American interests coincided, France 
could be assured of the support of the United States nuclear 
might. When their interests differed, the Force Nucléaire 
Stratégique could protect France.
THE WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO
The establishment of the strategic nuclear force and 
the French withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­
tion were directly related. By the 1960’s the conditions that 
had given rise to NATO had underwent substantial changes. The 
call for reform was not limited only to the French Government 
of Charles de Gaulle. The recovery of the European states in 
the 1950's lead them to advocate reforms that would adequately 
reflect within NATO their new strength. While any French 
government would have pressed for these reforms, only de
Gaulle would have proposed withdrawal as an alternative if
18the reforms were not acceded to.
De Gaulle’s policies were motivated by a mystical, 
nationalism that exalted France's glory and its historic 
role as a Great Power. NATO was viewed as the symbol and
^^Michel Debré, "France's Global Strategy," Foreign 
Affairs, XXXXIX, 3 (April, 1971), pp. 398-399.
18John Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (New 
York: Viking Press, 19717) , p . 47.
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instrument of the American protectorate over Western Europe. 
Its unreformed existence was anathema to Charles de Gaulle 
who viewed the role of protectorate as an impediment to 
French independence. The conditions of the 1950's had been 
such that it had been necessary for France to accept this 
subservience; the 1960's were different. In reviewing the 
policies of those years Premier Georges Pompidou stated:
"You know that our action over the past nine years has been 
aimed at restoring the independence of our policy. Today 
this independence is acquiesced.
One of the main motivations behind the French withdrawal 
from NATO was this desire to re-assert France’s independence. 
NATO, because of its American domination, was viewed as an 
obstacle to this goal. Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de 
Murville spoke of this relationship between defense and 
independence. He said:
. . . its disadvantages are that first it 
strips us French--whether the Government or 
the citizens are concerned--of the feeling 
of our responsibilities in defense matters 
and, consequently, to a very large degree, 
of the will to defend ourselves. Defense 
has become a somewhat anonymous thing in 
which we do not feel we are truly partici­
pating. And as soon as a country is no
France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign 
Policy: January-June, 1967, "Governmental Statement by Mr. 
Pompidou Before the National Assembly: April 18, 1967," 
p . 54.
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longer interested in its defense, it is not 
far--it must be said--from losing its inde­
pendence . 20
Independence carried with it the connotations of societal 
integrity and cultural heritage. The threat to French inde­
pendence posed by the lack of interest in defense did not 
merely endanger a state but the entire essence of nation­
ality.
That France’s actions represented a positive concern 
with its own problems and not an attempt to disparage the 
United States is evident by the distinction that was made 
between NATO and the Atlantic Alliance per se. Although 
American officials tended to perceive these as the same 
thing, the French associated the Atlantic Alliance with 
Western interests and NATO with American interests. De 
Gaulle never contemplated withdrawing from the Atlantic 
Alliance; he intended upon honoring France’s commitments 
to it.
The Atlantic Alliance exists. So long as 
the Soviets threaten the world, this alli­
ance must be maintained. France is an 
integral part of it. If the free world 
were attacked, or the old or the new con­
tinent, France would take part in the 
common defense of the coasts of her allies
2 0 France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign
Policy: 1966, "Interview by M. Couve de Murville to the ORTF
March 17, 1966," p. 28.
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21and with all the means that she has.
That this commitment implied a more "active" role than the 
United States anticipated for its "client" states is the 
origin of the Franco-American dispute that eventually lead 
de Gaulle to withdraw France from NATO. The Force Nucléaire
Stratégique was the means chosen by de Gaulle to achieve this 
aim.
. . . within the Atlantic Alliance--indis- 
pensible so long as the ambitions and the 
threats of the Soviets are raised--our 
country, while combining its defense with 
that of its allies, intends to remain the 
master and, if necessary, contribute to 
the common effort something quite different 
from the soulless and powerless assistance 
of a people that would no longer be respon­
sible for themselves. This leads us to 
provide ourselves with the modern means 
of ensuring our security, in other words, 
with the means for deterring any country 
whatsoever from attacking ours, at the risk 
of subjecting itself to frightful destruc­
tion. I mean, of course, atomic w e a p o n s . 22
These actions were not designed to weaken the Atlantic 
Alliance but, in a sense, to strengthen it. There was, how­
ever, an intention upon weakening American control over
2lFrance, French Embassy, New York, Maj or Addresses, 
Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle : 
May 19, 1958-January 51, 1964, "Sixth Press Conference Held by 
General de Gaulle as President of the French Republic in Paris 
at the Elysee Palace on May 15, 1962," p. 179.
? 2 France, French Embassy, New York, Major Addresses, 
Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle: 
May 19, 1958-January 51, 1964, "Address by President Charles de 
Gaulle on the Economy European Policy, The Atlantic Alliance 
Broadcast over ORTF on April 19, 1963," p. 25.
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Western Europe and France in particular. The actual steps 
taken in the withdrawal were structured such that no real 
military damage was done to the Atlantic Alliance. Although 
France "officially" withdrew from NATO on March 7, 1966, it 
had been slowly withdrawing the forces that it had committed 
to the NATO commands ever since March 7, 1959 (when it with­
drew its Mediterranean naval units). By spreading out its 
withdrawal over a number of years, de Gaulle gave his allies 
time to readjust their military postures.
By the 1960's the Soviet threat was perceived as dimin­
ishing. This factor was fundamental in explaining why de 
Gaulle was able and willing to cut France's ties with NATO. 
NATO had been accepted by France originally because of the 
Soviet military threat. As that threat lessened so did 
the justification for NATO. Other changes also affected 
the relationship of the European states vis-à-vis the United 
States. As Europe recovered in the post-World War II world, 
it focused its attention to its own problems. Separated 
from their empires (sometimes by violence), the European 
states no longer had true global interests. However, the 
United States did. The United States involvement in world 
affairs brought it into "conflict" with the Soviet Union. 
These conflicts, because of Europe's treaty commitments^ made 
it subject to threats of war over matters that it had no 
concern for. The reform movement, lead by France, desired
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to change NATO in order to minimize the chances of the United 
States leading them into an unwanted war.
Western defense was dependent upon nuclear weapons.
NATO, without any nuclear forces within its command struc­
ture, was not in the mainstream. As the American guarantee 
weakened, NATO proved inadequate to cope with the problem. 
NATO strategy was unilaterally decided by the United States;
the European "allies" were expected to comply. The European
2 3states did not possess a voice in the making of decisions.
As long as the United States had been invulnerable and its 
nuclear protection could be "relied" upon, this relationship 
gave rise to little concern. When, in the 1960's, this was 
no longer the case, this became a matter of contention 
between the United States and its Western European allies.
Now that the United States was vulnerable to attack itself, 
the European states were afraid the United States might, 
under the threat of nuclear retaliation, abandon them.
However, it was felt that if these states shared in the con­
trol of nuclear weapons this abandonment would not occur.
It was for this reason that the European states wanted a 
voice in the critical decisions that affected them.^^
^^Kissinger, pp. 94-95.
^^Robert Schaetzel, speech at the Ditchley Foundation, 
Oxfordshire, England, September 27, 1963, printed in The 
Atlantic Community Quarterly, I, 4 (Winter, 1963-64), p. 566
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The United States opposed any changes (through the NATO 
system) along this line. It did not want other nations 
having a voice in its fate. Decisions that were critical 
to the United States were deemed as inappropriate for other,
2 5less "responsible" states to have a voice in. These were 
the same fears that motivated the European states in their 
demands for a greater role within NATO. The United States 
unwillingness to accord to the European states the same 
protection that it demanded for itself further damaged the 
credibility of its nuclear guarantee (already under 
serious questioning). France,unable to achieve reforms 
within NATO, opted for an "independent" status similar to 
that claimed by the United States.
The NATO structure gave the United States practical 
control over the forces committed to it. This condition 
met with strenuous opposition on the part of French mili­
tary leaders. Army Chief of Staff Charles Ailleref expressed 
the essence of this situation when he said:
The defense of France was therefore in effect 
to be entrusted entirely to the United States 
and French forces were liable to be brought 
into action on the decision of American gen­
erals and not that of French leaders acting 
in accordance with directives from our gov-
25George Ball, address to the Princeton National Alumni 
Association (Woodrow Wilson Fiftieth Anniversary Group), 
Washington, D.C., April 26, 1963, printed in The Atlantic 
Community Quarterly, I, 2 (Summer, 1963), pp. 200-201.
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* 26 ernment.
De Gaulle took issue with this organizational structure from 
the moment he returned to power in France. In accelerating 
the development of the force de frappe he realized that there 
would be demands for its integration within the NATO command 
structure. The French desired to be allies and not a de­
pendent client state. A speech by Premier Pompidou before 
the National Assembly voiced France's intention of retaining 
control of its own destiny.
We refuse, it is true, to allow our armed 
forces, and especially our deterrent force, 
to be lost in an organization which neces­
sarily results in stripping us of any 
decision-making power of our own. But it 
is not necessary for us to give up our 
existence in order to be a good ally, it 
is doubtless just the opposite.27
It was the inability to reform this arrangement that neces­
sitated France's withdrawal from NATO under de Gaulle.
The affect that the NATO structure had upon the conven­
tional forces of France was itself sufficient cause for de 
Gaulle to contemplate withdrawal; the affect that it would 
have on the Force Nucléaire Stratégique made withdrawal
^^Charles Ailleret, lecture given before the NATO De­
fense College, printed in The Atlantic Community Quarterly,
II, 3 (Fall, 1964), p. 19.
27Ceorge5 Pompidou, Foreign Policy Statement before the 
French National Assembly, June 17, 1965, printed in The 
Atlantic Community Quarterly, III, 3 (Fall, 1965), pp. 328-329,
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necessary. In his Memoirs of Hope de Gaulle expressed this 
opinion in the following passage:
Hence, while continuing to belong to the 
alliance formed by the Treaty of Washington 
for mutual assistance in case of aggression, 
she planned to leave NATO sooner or later, 
the more so as she intended to equip herself 
with nuclear weapons which there could be no 
question of integrating into the system. More 
than anything else, political independence 
commensurate with my country's position and 
aims was essential to its survival in the 
future.28
De Gaulle's beliefs slowly gained wider and wider acceptance 
among the French leaders as his contentions were time and 
time again proved true.
Immediately upon assuming office de Gaulle set out to 
demonstrate that the United States would never allow NATO 
to undergo any meaningful reform. The "Tri-Directorate 
Proposal," the subject of a secret memorandum sent to Great 
Britain and the United States in September, 1958, posited 
that the three powers jointly control the West's nuclear 
arsenal (and the formulation of policy). De Gaulle in his 
Memoirs of Hope discussed the rationale behind this gambit.
France's accession to this summit would be 
all the more appropriate because the Western 
monopoly of atomic weapons would very soon
2 8Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope : Renewal and En­
deavor (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), p. 178.
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cease to belong exclusively to the Anglo- 
Saxons, now that we were about to acquire 
them. I therefore proposed that the alliance 
should henceforth be placed under a triple 
rather than a dual direction, failing which 
France would take no further part in NATO 
developments and would reserve the right, 
under Article 12 of the treaty which had 
inaugurated the system, either to demand 
its reform or to leave it. As I expected, 
the two recipients of my memorandum replied 
evasively. So there was nothing to prevent 
us from taking a c t i o n . 2 9
De Gaulle had been convinced that the United States (and its
junior partner. Great Britain) would not take up his offer
because it entailed a loss of independence and flexibility.
The tri-directorate proposal had been designed "to put its
recipients in the wrong in the eyes of French opinion," and
30this is precisely what it did. Because it had been in­
cluded in a secret memorandum, the French were aware only 
of the Anglo-American refusals and not of the nature of 
the "reforms" that de Gaulle had proposed. The tri-directorate 
proposal ended any thoughts within the French Government about 
integrating the striking force into the NATO structure. Within 
NATO the Force Nucléaire Stratégique would have been removed 
from French control.
Events over the next few years tended to re-enforce these 
impressions of America. The activities that transpired during
Z^De Gaulle, pp. 202-203. 
30 Hartley, p. 211.
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the Kennedy Administration were the most flagrant afronts 
to French sensibilities. Under the Kennedy Administration 
the United States unilaterally abandoned the policy of mas­
sive retaliation for one of "flexible response." Flexible 
response represented precisely the fear that had motivated 
the European states into demanding a voice in NATO policy.
The flexible response doctrine removed the threat of re­
taliation from the barricades thrown up to defend Western 
Europe against the Soviet Union. Premier Pompidou challenged 
this turn of events before the National Assembly.
Within NATO itself, we have seen the replace­
ment, gradual and without our agreement, of 
the initial strategy that was based on de­
terrence and, consequently, on the immediate 
use of atomic reprisals, by a strategy called 
"flexible" which, under the pretext of lessen­
ing the risk of total war, actually consists 
in enabling the United States to limit the 
field of the initial operations by sparing ,1 
the territory of the main potential aggressor.
Flexible response was the abandonment of Western Europe by 
the United States. It was designed to spare American soil 
from nuclear holocaust but at the cost of Western Europe.
The Cuban Missile Crisis gave the fears that had been 
roaming around Europe reality. Although the actions taken
31France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign 
Policy: 1966, "Statement by M. Georges Pompidou Before the 
National Assembly and the Senate (excerpts): April 13, 1966," 
p . 46.
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by President Kennedy were unilateral, there was little if 
any disagreement over their appropriateness. The lesson 
of October was that the United States, because of interests 
(and adventures) for which Western Europe had no concern, 
could bring them all to the brink of war. As the dif­
ferences between American and European interests increased, 
this fear of unwanted war grew. De Gaulle cited this as a 
salient determinant in France's decision to withdraw from 
NATO.
. . . while the prospects of a world war break­
ing out on account of Europe are dissipating, 
conflicts in which America engages in other 
parts of the world--as the day before yester­
day in Korea, yesterday in Cuba, today in 
Vietnam--risk, by virtue of that famous esca­
lation, being extended so that the result could 
be a general conflagration. In that case Europe-- 
who's strategy is, within NATO, that of America-- 
would be automatically involved in the struggle, 
even when it would not have so desired.32
This fear prompted de Gaulle to "hurriedly" separate France 
from NATO and the hegemony of American policy.
Throughout this period the United States engaged in a 
constant effort to have the French striking force integrated 
into NATO. This would have meant that the United States 
would exercise control over it; since there was no reciprocity
32France, Ambassade de France, New York, French Foreign
Policy : 1966, "Press Conference Held by Charles de Gaulle
(excerpts): February 21, 1966," p. 20.
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to these proposals (i.e., the United States was unwilling 
to lose total control over its own nuclear forces) de Gaulle 
opposed them. To have done otherwise would have forfeited 
the security obtained by their own nuclear deterrent. Be­
cause NATO was so controlled by the United States, any 
nuclear forces within it would have been subject to the 
same disadvantages inherent in the American force; i.e., 
the fear of the United States sacrificing Europe would have 
still existed. Since this is what the force de frappe had 
been created to remedy, integration was totally out of the 
question.
The tri-dictorate proposal had demonstrated that the 
United States would not consent to having its own forces 
merged into any integrated command. The various multi­
national proposals (disguised as "integrated commands") 
that were offered by the United States in the early 1960's 
all entailed, ultimately, American control of all nuclear 
weapons--its own which were not to be "integrated" and those 
of its allies which were.
Stopgap plans for sharing our nuclear weap­
onry- -multi- lateral , multi-national, inter­
allied mixed crews, or whatever name--turn 
out to be form without substance. Each has 
a built in trigger guard, some gimmick to 
make certain that ultimate control remains
in our h a n d s . 33
33Richard Nixon, Excerpts from an address to the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors, April 20, 1963, published in 
The Atlantic Community Quarterly, I, 2 (Summer, 1963), p. 205.
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Not only were those schemes designed to leave the United 
States in control of its own missiles but to gain control 
of those of its allies--particularly the French force. 
Premier Pompidou outlined the differences that were the 
intended result of the American schemes.
If the President of the United States considers 
that nuclear forces must be engaged, he has 
95 per cent of the American atomic weapons 
at his disposal for that and does not need 
to ask anyone's advice. What good would it 
be for the European nations to be able, in 
theory, to veto the engagement of the remain­
ing 5 per cent? If on the contrary, the 
American President refuses, against the advice 
of the European nations to engage the nuclear 
forces, his veto is enough to paralyze every­
thing. Who can therefore dispute that our 
deterrent force, modest but real, would lose 
all but the semblance of meaning if it were"integrated"?34
By avoiding the dangers inherently associated with integra­
tion, France hoped to re-assert its independence.
^^Pompidou, p. 328.
CHAPTER V 
CONSEQUENCES
Politics do not occur in a vacuum. The creation of 
the Force Nucléaire Stratégique was affected by the milieu 
of French politics. In the Beer-Ulam approach the creation 
of a new policy sets into motion the agents of change that 
begin the patterns of government process anew. The three 
sections of this chapter examine the advantages to France 
of its independent nuclear force, its disadvantages, and 
what the "future" holds in store for the Force Nucléaire 
Stratégique.
THE POLICY OF TRADITION
The Force Nucléaire Stratégique is accepted as the 
optimum defense policy by those who hold power in France.
It was the expression and instrument of France’s drive 
under de Gaulle to reassert its independence. Although 
de Gaulle's personality and style cannot be discounted, 
it cannot be overlooked that he pursued a policy rooted 
in France’s tradition. Be Gaulle desired to re-assert 
France’s role of independence in world affairs.^ His
^Roy Macridis (ed.). Modern European Governments :
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policy was also concerned with France's perennial search 
2for security. These two objectives have been traditional 
elements of French policy. The major thrust of the Force 
Nucléaire Stratégique was to provide France with the cap­
abilities to pursue other, more specific policies. As such 
it is apolitical; the nuclear force can serve the purposes 
of any French government. This flexibility provides it 
with an advantage that would mititate against any drastic 
changes. The economic considerations (sunk costs, alter­
nate program funding, etc.) are dealt with in the following 
section. It should be noted, however, that any change in 
France's military security policy (which would entail an 
alternative program and not merely the cessation of any 
program) would be extremely costly.
The question of France's relations with NATO are per­
haps more perplexing. Although de Gaulle's withdrawal of 
France from NATO appears drastic when compared with the 
policies of the Fourth Republic, an examination of larger 
scope reveals that it was the Fourth Republic's actions 
which were drastic. The Fourth Republic had been too weak 
following World War II to re-assert France's independence;
Cases in Comparative Policy Making (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-HalT^ 196 8) , p. 101.
2Elizabeth Stabler, "French Military Policy," Current 
History, L, 296 (April, 1966), p. 232.
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it had to settle for the "abnormal" protectorate relation-
3ship offered by NATO in order to secure France’s borders. 
When France recovered its strength, it was able, under de 
Gaulle, to throw off the NATO "yoke."
It is important to remember the differences that de 
Gaulle saw between the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. An alli­
ance composed of "co-equal" member states was never objected 
to; it was only to the organizational structure that trans­
formed the European states into clients that de Gaulle 
objected to. The Pompidou government has cooperated with 
the European NATO members under a number of circumstances.
As far as French readmittance to NATO is concerned, this 
would be dependent upon its reform (essentially involving 
the end of American control).
De Gaulle wanted to restore France to its "rightful" 
role in the world. Although specific policies in the realm 
of international relations are beyond the scope of this 
paper, it should be noted that the nuclear force (in giving 
France the capabilities, real and psychological, to maintain 
its independence) has enabled France to pursue a more 
activist role in world affairs. The prestige associated 
with the possession of nuclear weapons has given France a 
greater voice in the arena of nations. Its policy of
3Simon Serfaty, France, De Gaulle and Europe : The Policy 
of the Fourth and Fifth Republics Toward the Continent (Balti­
more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 118.
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independence vis-à-vis both the United States and the Soviet 
Union has served as a rallying point for those Western nations
not in agreement with the superpowers.
MATERIAL SECURITY
The nation de Gaulle inherited in 1958 was well on its 
way to economic recovery. The immobilism of the Fourth Re­
public tended to hide this development. It is an important
occurrence in that de Gaulle would not have been able to
construct the costly Force Nucléaire Stratégique otherwise.^ 
The initial costs necessary for a nuclear program are so 
horrendous that unless a nation is "prosperous” it cannot 
afford to undertake such a project without totally endanger­
ing its economy. De Gaulle was able to meet these costs 
both through France’s economic growth and the transference 
of funds from other programs (the NATO commitment and the 
500,000-man reduction within the army). But the nuclear 
force did suffer setbacks due to economic factors.^
With the expansion of the French economy the workers 
and other lower class groups expected to share in the new 
prosperity. As their expectations failed to be met, they 
became more and more dissatisfied with France’s domestic
^Cecil Crabb, "The Gaullist Revolt Against the Anglo- 
Saxons," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 351, 4 (January, 1964), pp. 20-21.
^Guy de Carmoy, "France and the Atlantic Community," 
Current History, LVIII, 345 (May, 1970), p. 269.
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policy until they erupted in the "Spirit of May." The riots 
and strikes carried on by the students and workers in May,
1968, forced the government of Charles de Gaulle to pay more 
attention to the growing social welfare demands of the French 
people. The money to fulfill these demands was drawn, in part, 
from the defense budget. Although the modernization of the 
military was not halted, it was delayed and in some instances 
forced to modify its plans (for instance, mechanized, armour 
divisions ceased to be mentioned).^ These delays in the 
nuclear force were eventually made up and the program com­
pleted.^ The costs that affect the Force Nucléaire Stratégique 
are now mainly those of upkeep. For this reason it is unlikely 
that any French government would scrap it and start from 
scratch building another defense apparatus, especially since 
the credibility (effectiveness) of the nuclear force has not 
been questioned.
CONCLUSIONS
The question of après de Gaulle intrigued the scholars 
of the Fifth Republic throughout de Gaulle's presidency.
That the presidential system of the Fifth Republic functioned
^Guy de Carmoy, "The Last Year of De Gaulle's Foreign 
Policy," International Affairs, XXXV, 3 (July, 1969), pp. 
425-426.
7Edward Kolodziej, "French Mediterranean Policy: The 
Politics of Weakness," International Affairs, XXXVII, 3 
(July, 1971), p. 504.
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with de Gaulle was no proof that it would under the leader­
ship of a "lesser" man. With the removal of de Gaulle from 
its presidency, it was posited that the Fifth Republic 
would experience an entropy of power. To some extent this 
redistribution has occurred under President Pompidou, but 
he, although stylistically different from de Gaulle, has 
been able to provide the presidency with another strong 
leader.
The Pompidou presidency has been Gaullist in spirit 
and fact. It was under President Pompidou that the Force 
Nucléaire Stratégique's deployment was completed. The 
costs of this, although delayed by the need to meet France's 
social welfare demands, were met. The immediate post-de 
Gaulle years have been a continuation of de Gaulle's 
policies (although the loss of de Gaulle has greatly 
affected the unity and direction of the Gaullists). This 
is not too startling when one compares the governments under 
President Pompidou with those under de Gaulle. The key per­
sonnel in both are the same; Pompidou, Chaban-Delmas,
Messmer and Debre were all ministers under de Gaulle 
(Chaban-Delmas was President of the National Assembly).
These men had supported de Gaulle in his modernization 
policy and after 1969 continued to support that policy.
A change has and is occurring with regard to the
nature of the post-de Gaulle governments. Whereas de Gaulle
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relied heavily upon administrative personnel. President 
Pompidou (for the years 1969-1973) has used fewer civil
Oservants in his cabinets. The number of elected officials 
within the governments has markedly increased since de 
Gaulle left office in April, 1969. Although it is too early 
to predict anything with a great degree of accuracy, this 
trend "bodes ill" for the Fifth Republic. A perennial ques­
tion in French politics has been ministerial responsibility; 
is the government responsible to the head of state or to the 
legislature? It has been on this question that France’s 
previous attempts at presidentialism have foundered. The 
Fifth Republic will eventually have to face and answer this 
question.
It is unlikely that the Gaullists would endeavor to 
change France’s military security policy (as long as it 
fulfilled its function). Not only were they instrumental 
in completing the Force Nucléaire Stratégique but the costs 
that a new program would entail militate against such a 
course of action (unless, of course, it was deemed absolutely 
necessary because of obsolescence). An examination of the 
most likely "alternative" to Gaullist leadership leads to 
the same conclusion. The Socialist-Communist coalition 
that proved a viable contender in the March, 1973 legisla-
^The Statesman’s Yearbook, 1958-1973.
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tive elections is mainly concerned with meeting the social 
welfare demands of the workers and other lower class groups. 
They would be less likely to favor the funding of a new 
system than the Gaullists. With regard to foreign affairs, 
Francois Mitterand, the coalition's "leader," foresaw "no
9objective change" if they were to come to power.
The Force Nucleaire Stratégique represents a return 
to France's traditional policy of independence. It was 
designed to meet the security needs left exposed by the 
failure of the American nuclear guarantee and, as long as 
it does this, it will continue to be supported. The pos­
session of nuclear weapons provides France with the flex­
ibility (derived from the security of deterrence) to pursue 
other policies on a global scale. Of course, a government 
that reputiated this role would not need a nuclear force 
but in a nation that is ever so conscious of its prestige 
and historic role this is unlikely. The civil service and 
the military have become "attached" to the nuclear program 
as a guarantee of France's independence. This symbolic 
attachment is also prevalent among the general population 
which,with France's tradition of insecurity, makes the 
nuclear force a valuable bulwark to the government.
^"Approaching a Crucial Vote," Time, March 5, 1973, p. 22
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